

2 DEC 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conversation with Secretary Brown,
1 December 1977

1. Discussed PRM-23:

a. There is considerable difference of opinion on the definition of national and tactical. Secretary Brown wants it based on the users and I'd like it based on the collectors. He feels that you can only decide which collector's budget to put a collection system in based on who's going to use it. I pointed out there was more than who was going to use it involved in where it went in the budget. There was also the factor of management and interplay with other systems. Essentially, there is a certain circularity to the argument but I still believe that only a collector's definition is practicable. We did agree that in the long run it was basically going to be a matter of case-by-case determination.



b. The Secretary made reference to some exception I took in my letter to him on PRM-23 about survivability (I'd forgotten what that was). He indicated he thought that that could be resolved.

2. FY 79 Budget:

a. I assured Secretary Brown that I would represent his views on [redacted] if they weren't represented in the OMB write-ups.

b. Because he has a "joint" review of his budget with OMB, he has agreement with OMB that their meeting with the President will not lead to any decisions. We ought to look into this. The decisions will be made at the meeting with SecDef present.

c. I invited Secretary Brown to be present at my meeting with the President on the intelligence budget.



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d. We discussed the [] situation. I believe I'm coming down to a feeling that we may have to take a position that we're going to build five [] that we are going to fly them out; that we don't want to specify the interval; that we will try to use them in as sparing a manner as possible so as to have enough left over when [] becomes available and [] is phased out that we can keep [] as the emergency back-up until such time as we decide it is either too expensive to be worth doing or other back-ups are available.

3. [] Pending any move by State to try to cancel this activity, Defense is putting very tight controls on the distribution [] We will still receive them, however.

4. Secretary Atherton at State has contacted General Fish at Defense with a request [] for help in building defense for [] aircraft against SA-7's. The Defense Department needs several seekerheads from SA-7's in order to comply with this request. They'd like to know if we have some available. I'd like to get an answer back to Secretary Brown on that very quickly.

5. DIA Building: Secretary Brown has received the second study (I presume the one I sent to him) and is reviewing it. In his words, the question of where it would be funded and where it would be located were both still up in the air.

6. Secretary Brown agreed that we should resist full funding for the NRO. I have signed the letter accordingly. []

7. Secretary Brown suggested that in our briefings for Senator Nunn tomorrow that we inform him of the degree of information we have on Soviet ground forces movements, e.g., the recent semi-annual rotation. Apparently, Senator Nunn is less optimistic that we will detect movements of their forces.

9. I delivered to Secretary Brown the paper on Soviet clandestine acquisition of technology.

10. I delivered to Secretary Brown and we discussed the concept of having a single point of contact for agreements with the Congress on exchange of information. His first point was that there maybe was

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
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some value in having extra impedimenta and delay mechanisms to make sure we didn't go too far. He did agree with my concept that it was quite embarrassing to have either dilatory or contradictory responses as we do now. I made the point that my objective was not to override NSA and others but simply to arrange to work out the nature of the agreements inside the intelligence community and then go to the Congress with a united front.

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12. Secretary Brown gave me a series of comments on the OMB budget issues which had been developed by his staff.



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STANSFIELD TURNER
Director

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2	ADDCI		X		
3	AD/DCI/IC	X (paras. 2 & 8)			
4	D/NFAC		X		
5	DDO	X (para. 4)			
6	DDA		X (para. 5 extracted)		
7	DDS&T		X (para. 3 extracted)		
8	LC		X (paras. 7 & 10 extracted)		
9	D/DCI/CT		X (para. 1 extracted)		
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